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ANTITRUST (U.S.) - EXEMPTION FROM ANTITRUST
LAWS - CAPPER-VOLSTEAD IMMUNITY NOT APPLICABLE TO AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVE ENGAGED IN EXPORT COMPETITION WITH WEBBPOMERENE ASSOCIATION.
Pacific Coast AgriculturalExport Association v. Sunkist Growers,
Inc., 526 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct.
1741 (1976)
Plaintiff Pacific Coast Agricultural Export Association is an
unincorporated Webb-Pomerene association of fresh fruit exporters.' Until 1966, Pacific Coast had received the bulk of its
supply for export to Hong Kong from defendant Sunkist Growers,
Inc. Sunkist is a federated agricultural cooperative of fresh fruit
producers, qualified under the Capper-Volstead Act, 2 whose mem1. Webb-Pomerene Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1970). Section 61 defines "association" as "any corporation or combination, by contract or otherwise, of two or more
persons, partnerships or corporations." Section 61 provides:
Nothing contained in sections 1 to 7 of this title shall be construed as declaring
to be illegal an association entered into for the sole purpose of engaging in
export trade and actually engaged solely in such export trade, or an agreement
made or act done in the course of export trade by such association, provided
such association, agreement, or act is not in restraint of trade within the United
States and is not in restraint of the export trade of any domestic competitor
of such association: Provided, That such association does not, either in the
United States or elsewhere, enter into any agreement, understanding, or conspiracy,
or do any act which artificially or intentionally enhances or depresses prices
within the United States of commodities of the class exported by such association,
or which substantially lessens competition within the United States or otherwise
restrains trade therein.
Broadly, the statute permits U.S. exporters to combine for the sole purpose of
engaging in export trade while enjoying exemption from antitrust liability.
See generally W. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS
ch. 7 (rev. ed. 1973).
2. Capper-Volstead Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 291-292 (1970). Section 291 provides:
Persons engaged in the production of agricultural products as farmers, planters,
ranchmen, dairymen, nut or fruit growers may act together in associations,
corporate or otherwise, with or without capital stock, in collectively processing,
preparing for market, handling, and marketing in interstate and foreign commerce,
such products of persons so engaged. Such associations may have marketing
agencies in common; and such associations and their members may make the
necessary contracts and agreements to effect such purposes: Provided, however,
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bers grow and pack citrus fruit for sale in the United States and
abroad.3 In 1966 Sunkist terminated its arrangement with Pacific
Coast and began direct sales to Hong Kong through an exclusive
agent, Reliance Commercial Enterprises, Inc. In the following
That such associations are operated for the mutual benefit of the members thereof,
as such producers, and conform to one or both of the following requirements:
First. That no member of the association is allowed more than one vote
because of the amount of stock or membership capital he may own therein, or,
Second. That the association does not pay dividends on stock or membership
capital in excess of 8 per centum per annum.
And in any case to the following:
Third. That the association shall not deal in the products of non-members
to an amount greater in value than such as are handled by it for members.
The Act extends the antitrust exemption afforded agricultural cooperatives
by § 6 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 17, by authorizing producers to organize
capital stock associations which may operate collectively in production and marketing.
Sunkist was found to be improperly organized for purposes of the CapperVolstead exemption in Case Swayne v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 389 U.S. 384, reh.
denied, 390 U.S. 930 (1967). Sunkist reorganized and in Case Swayne v. Sunkist
Growers, Inc., 355 F. Supp. 408 (C.D. Cal. 1971), the court found that Sunkist's
present structure complied with the requirements of Capper-Volstead; it was (a) a
non-profit organization, (b) whose membership was limited to citrus fruit growers
and associations of growers, (c) who solely possessed the voting power of the
association, to the exclusion of all non-growers in the policy making decisions of
the association. This formed the basis for the district court's instruction that Sunkist
was a lawfully constituted Capper-Volstead cooperative.
3. Sunkist's organizational structure is described in detail in Case Swayne v.
Sunkist Growers, Inc., 355 F. Supp. 408. Sunkist's members grow approximately
75% of all oranges grown in California and Arizona.
It should also be noted that Sunkist belongs to the California-Arizona Citrus
League. The League is a voluntary non-profit trade association composed of marketers
of California-Arizona citrus, largely cooperatives, which represent approximately 90%
of the 12,500 citrus growers in California and Arizona. For an 8-year period ending
1971-1972, exports averaged 28.3% of total shipments of fresh citrus from California
and Arizona. Currently the dollar value of citrus and citrus products exported by
the California-Arizona citrus industry exceeds $125 million annually. See Hearings
on H.R. 6767 Before the House Comm. on Ways & Means, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 4186
(1973) (statement of James Van Horn, Past President, California-Arizona Citrus
League).
4. In the past, Sunkist had used numerous export companies, including Pacific
Coast, for its Hong Kong sales. Beginning in 1966, Sunkist performed all export
functions in its relationship with Reliance as its sole agent in Hong Kong. In
addition to performing all the usual import-export agent's functions, Reliance served
as promotion agent for Sunkist in Hong Kong. This broader role enabled Reliance
to charge a lower agent's commission per carton and thereby reduced the wholesale
price of oranges in Hong Kong. See Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 9, et seq.,
Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Pacific Coast Agricultural Export Association, No. 75-1325.
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six months Sunkist captured nearly 70% of the market for American oranges sold in Hong Kong.5
In July 1968, Pacific Coast, as assignee of the rights of seven
of its members, filed suit against Sunkist in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California, alleging
violations of the antitrust laws. In August 1969, M-C International, Inc. (M-C), a non-association exporter, and Robert
Louis Lepinay, filed similar actions against Sunkist and Reliance.
All suits were filed under sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton
6
Act and 28 U.S.C. § 13777 seeking damages and injunctive relief
from the defendants' alleged violations of sections I and 2 of the
Sherman Act.'
In support of their section 1 claim, plaintiffs alleged that
Reliance had sought, through communications to Sunkist, restrictions on the supply of domestic oranges available to the
exporters; that Sunkist had attempted to frustrate plaintiffs'
shipping orders by over-ordering the shipping space necessary to
accommodate its own orders; that Sunkist supplied to Reliance a
list of Hong Kong customers acquired by plaintiffs; and that
Sunkist terminated export sales to domestic exporters. These
same allegations were used in support of plaintiffs' section 2
claim, with the important additional allegation that from 1967 to
1971 Sunkist controlled 45% to 70% of the Hong Kong export
market for fresh citrus fruit. For section 2 purposes, the relevant
market was defined as "oranges grown in Arizona and California
for export in Hong Kong." 9 Sunkist responded to these allegations
5. The court noted:
The percentage sold by plaintiffs and other exporters later increased somewhat,
ranging between 38.1% and 55.5% from 1967 to 1971. Although an improving
overall market in Hong Kong allowed three of the Association's assignors to
attain 1970 volume sales exceeding comparable pre-1966 figures, neither M-C
nor any of the assignors has regained its pre-1966 share.
526 F.2d 1201 n.7.
6. Clayton Act §§ 4, 16, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 16 (1970). Section 4 authorizes
plaintiffs in antitrust actions to collect treble damages and attorneys' fees. Section
16 authorizes plaintiffs in antitrust actions to seek injunctive relief.
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1948) is the general jurisdictional statute for antitrust
actions. It provides: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action or proceeding arising under any Act of Congress regulating commerce or
protecting trade and commerce against restraints and monopolies."
8. Sherman Act §§ 1, 2, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1970). Section 1 provides that
every combination in restraint of trade is illegal. Section 2 provides that every person
who monopolizes or attempts or conspires to monopolize is guilty of a misdemeanor.
9. 526 F.2d 1203.

ANTfRUST

by challenging their accuracy, asserting that the actions were
reasonable responses to a competitive market, and claiming they
were insufficient to sustain a verdict. 10
The jury returned a verdict against defendants Sunkist and
Reliance in November 19721" and awarded total damages to
Pacific Coast and M-C of almost one million dollars.12 In addition,
injunctive relief was granted: the exclusive selling agreement
between Sunkist and Reliance was terminated and Sunkist was
enjoined from refusing to sell oranges from both its domestic and
export departments to qualified exporters. 3 Plaintiffs' request
10. On Dec. 8, 1969, the cases were consolidated for discovery, pre-trial, and
trial proceedings by stipulation of the parties. On Aug. 17, 1971, the district court
ordered a bifurcated trial before the same jtiry and beginning in Sept. 1972, the
liability phase was tried before the jury.
11. The jury found against plaintiff Lepinay as to all counts. With respect to
Sunkist and Reliance, the jury found that (1) Sunkist and Reliance had conspired in
restraint of trade by refusing to sell oranges to the exporters for export, (2) that
Sunkist and Reliance had conspired to monopolize the relevant market consisting of
oranges grown in Arizona and California for export to Hong Kong, (3) that Sunkist
had attempted to monopolize that market, and (4) that Sunkist had monopoly power
and did in fact monopolize that market.
12. The jury returned verdicts against Sunkist Growers, Inc., in favor of the
seven members assigning their rights to plaintiff Pacific Coast Agricultural Export
Association in the following amounts:
$ 10,677.00
John De Martini Co., Inc ---------------13,514.00
Ghiselli Bros., Inc.
2,781.00
Honolulu Distributors, Inc.--99,941.00
Paramount Export Co.-- ----16,936.00
Sunrise Produce Co.--------87,464.00
Liberty Gold Fruit Co.
7,391.00
Pacific Produce Co.- $238,704.00
Sunkist and Reliance were found jointly and severally liable to M-C for $2,363.00.
The court awarded $200,000 in attorneys' fees, $197,000 of which were paid
to Pacific Coast's attorneys. Additional attorneys' fees related to plaintiffs' posttrial motions for judgment n.o.v. and a new trial were awarded in the amount of
$5,250.
Total treble damages and attorneys' fees were $928,451. See Petitioner's
Brief for Certiorari, supra note 4, app. at 39-40.
13. The district court noted: "[H]owever, nothing in this decree shall be
construed as enjoining or restraining Sunkist from selling oranges directly to Hong
Kong, either on its own or through non-exclusive sales agents." Memorandum of
Opinion and Order of United States District Court, Northern District of California,
in Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari, supra note 4, app. at 36-38.
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that Sunkist Growers, Inc. be dissolved was denied.14 Both parties appealed and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit affirmed.' 5 The appellate court found, inter alia,
that Sunkist did not enjoy Capper-Volstead immunity; that
sufficient evidence supported the finding of Sherman Act violations; and that the amount of attorneys' fees and scope of equitable relief was proper.
As stated, the Ninth Circuit held that Sunkist's activities
were not immune from antitrust liability under the CapperVolstead Act. As to the Section 1 claim, the court ruled that
plaintiffs were required to show only that Sunkist's actions were
motivated by a desire to accomplish anti-competitive objectives;
that the determination of such an objective was a question for
the jury, and that there existed ample evidence to support the
finding against Sunkist. With respect to the Section 2 claim,
the court found Sunkist's 45% to 70% control of the relevant
market sufficient to support a jury's finding of the existence of
monopoly power, and ample evidence to support the specific
intent and "wrongful" act (or acts) required to sustain a finding
that defendants attempted to monopolize. Similarly, the evidence
supported the jury's conclusion that defendants had conspired
with specific intent to monopolize an area of commerce. The
Ninth Circuit also ruled on the issue of damages, holding that the
plaintiffs had produced sufficient evidence to show causal connection between defendants' unlawful conduct and injury to plaintiffs; and that although market share projections may not have
been exact, there was sufficient evidence to support a reasonable
estimate of damage by the jury. Lastly, the propriety of equitable
relief was considered. In support of the district court action, the
Ninth Circuit ruled that the injunctive relief was proper in that it
was designed to restore competition in the relevant market and
that the remedy of dissolution is not available to private antitrust
litigants.
14. Id. Plaintiffs had contended that dissolution was the only effective method
of curing the illegal practices found by the jury.
15. Defendants appealed on several grounds, alleging errors in evidence and
procedure, insufficiency of proof of prohibited conduct as well as insufficiency of
proof of actual damages, improper equitable relief and excessive attorneys' fees. Plaintiffs appealed on the grounds of inadequate equitable relief: specifically, that the court
should have enjoined all sales by Sunkist in Hong Kong for a period equal to the
period of violations (6 years) and that the court's refusal to dissolve Sunkist was
an abuse of discretion. 526 F.2d 1201.
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The most significant aspect of the Ninth Circuit's holding
concerns the use of Capper-Volstead immunity in an international
context. This is the first instance where that immunity has been
invoked as a defense in an international trade case. The inherent
conflicts between the policy objectives of the Webb-Pomerene
and Capper-Volstead acts may have significant impact on international trade in light of the Supreme Court's refusal to resolve
the question.16
Two Supreme Court decisions have narrowly defined the
limits of the Capper-Volstead exemption. In United States v.
Borden Co.,17 the Court stated that the involvement of "other
persons" in the allegedly exempt cooperative caused the exemption to be denied.' 8 In Maryland and Virginia Milk Producers
16. Plaintiffs and defendants both filed Petitions for Certiorari in Mar. 1976.
44 U.S.L.W. 3533 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1976). Pacific Coast and M-C International posed
the following question for consideration by the Court:
Is the remedy of dissolution available to a plaintiff in a private antitrust
action under 15 U.S.C. § 16 where (a) the defendant whose dissolution is sought
is an habitual violator of the antitrust laws and (b) the jury has found that such
defendant violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act by a conspiracy to restrain trade,
and violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act by monopolizing, attempting to monopolize,
and conspiring to monopolize? Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari, at 2, Pacific Coast
Agricultural Export Ass'n v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., No. 75-1311 (U.S. Mar. 23,
1976).
Sunkist Growers, Inc. presented the following four questions:
1. Can a private party antitrust plaintiff maintain an action under Section 4
of the Clayton Act by proving anticompetitive purpose but not effect?
2. May a private party antitrust plaintiff calculate damages based on lost
sales projections which assume no competing sales by a defendant when
that defendant's competition is not part of the claimed antitrust violations?
3. Is a market share of approximately 50% sufficient to establish monopoly
power absent other proof of power to control prices or exclude competition?
4. Does an association which itself does not engage in business have standing
under Section 16 of the Clayton Act to seek injunctive relief for the
benefit of its members?
Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari, supra note 4, at 2. Certiorari was denied. 96 S. Ct.
1741.
17. 308 U.S. 188 (1939).

For a thorough discussion of this case, see Noakes,
SECTION ON ANTITRUST LAw 407 (1961).

Exemption for Cooperatives, 19 ABA

18. Confronted with a conspiracy involving cooperatives, milk distributors, labor
unions, a trade association, and government officials in the Chicago milk market, the
Court stated that:
the right of these agricultural producers thus to unite in preparing for market
and in marketing their products, and to make the contracts which are necessary
for that collaboration, cannot be deemed to authorize any combination or con-

THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW JOURNAL

Ass'n. v. United States19 the court stated that an exempt cooperative may not exceed the bounds of the "legitimate objects" test
of Section 6 of the Clayton Act.20 If it does, the antitrust exempin
tion may be lost.21 Both of these tests have been applied
22
varying degrees by the courts in similar domestic cases.
In this case, however, Sunkist interposed its Capper-Volstead
immunity as a defense in an international context and a threshold
determination had to be made of the extent to which CapperVolstead was intended to apply to such situations.
Evidence in the congressional debates suggests that the original intention was to confine the scope of the bill to "trading within
2 4
the United States" 23 because "[t]his is a domestic situation.
However, the final language of the statute is controlling and
spiracy with other persons in restraint of trade that these producers may see fit
to devise.
308 U.S. 204-5.
19. 362 U.S. 458 (1960).
20. 15 U.S.C. § 17. In part, this section reads: "Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor, agricultural,
or horticultural organizations, instituted for the purposes of mutual help . . .. or
restrain individual members of such organizations from lawfully carrying out the
legitimate objects thereof" (emphasis added).
21. The Court held that the Capper-Volstead Act "did not leave cooperatives
free to engage in practices against other persons in order to monopolize trade, or
restrain or suppress competition with the cooperative." 362 U.S. 458.
22. The "other persons" test has been clearly followed in Alabama Power
Company v. Alabama Electric Cooperative, Inc., 394 F.2d 672 (5th Cir. 1968) and
Waters v. National Farmers Organization, Inc., 328 F. Supp. 1229 (7th Cir. 1971).
The "legitimate objects" test was applied in Marketing Assistance Plan, Inc. v.
Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 1019 (5th Cir, 1971). Both approaches
have been applied in Treasure Valley Potato Bargaining Ass'n v. Ore-Ida Foods, Inc.,
497 F.2d 203 (9th Cir. 1974) and in Knuth v. Erie Crawford Dairy Cooperative
Ass'n, 395 F.2d 420 (3d Cir. 1968) where the court most succinctly combined the
two strands of analysis: "Section 1 of the Capper-Volstead Act does not authorize
combinations or conspiracies between cooperatives and others in restraint of trade.
Indeed, such a cooperative may even be liable under the Sherman Act without proof
of involvement of non-cooperatives if the activity under attack is predatory." Id. at 423
(citations omitted).
On the Capper-Volstead Act generally, see Noakes, supra note 17; Lemon, The
Capper-Volstead Act - Will it Ever Grow Up?, 22 An. L. REv. 443 (1969-1970);
Hufseadler, A Prediction: The Exemption Favoring Agricultural Cooperatives Will
Be Reaffirmed, 22 AD. L. REv. 455 (1969-1970).
23. 62 CoNrG. Rsc. 2171 (1922).
24. Id. at 2174.
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applies to producers "marketing in interstate and foreign com-

merce" (emphasis added)

.25

Thus, in holding that the Capper-Volstead Act does not
"authorize any combination or conspiracy with others which unreasonably restrain interstate or foreign commerce" or "immunize
cooperatives engaged in competition-stifling practices from actions
under the anti-monopolization provisions of the Sherman Act,"
the Ninth Circuit did not misapply the basic principles of the
antitrust law in this area, notwithstanding the limited domestic
application of Capper-Volstead in the past.2 This view is further
supported by the fact that the violations in this case took place
within the United States and were affecting domestic prices and
commerce. However, irrespective of the legal soundness of the
Ninth Circuit's decision, a very basic policy conflict remains
unresolved.
The legislative history of the Capper-Volstead Act demonstrates clearly that one of the primary policy considerations behind the exemption of agricultural cooperatives was the elimination of the non-producer "middleman" who took a large share of
the profits from agricultural sales.2 7 The Supreme Court articulated this policy in Case-Swayne Co., Inc. v. Sunkist Growers,
Inc.,5 where it stated that "a principal concern of Congress was
participation in the collectivity of the predatory
to prohibit the
29
middleman."
The policy conflict in the present case stems from the fact
that plaintiffs are precisely the middlemen against whom the
25. Supra note 2. The obvious advice of Professor Lemon is noteworthy: "As is
true with any legislative history, you can find in the Congressional discussions of the
Capper-Volstead Act some material which supports and some material which refutes
nearly any point you wish to make." Lemon, supra note 22, at 443.
26. 526 F.2d 1202. Although the Ninth Circuit cites Borden as supporting the
proposition that the Capper-Volstead Act extends to foreign commerce, that case
dealt exclusively with domestic trade and contained no language relating to foreign
commerce.
27. Senator Norris from Nebraska stated: "If the producers form a cooperative
that will eliminate middlemen, they will benefit themselves and they will benefit
everyone who consumes any of the things that they produce." 62 CoNG. REc. 2260
(1922).

Senator Walsh from Montana agreed: "If we are going to have a monopoly
at all, I would rather have a monopoly of producers than a monopoly of middlemen."
Id. at 2159.
28. 389 U.S. 384.
29. Id. at 393.
30. 526 F.2d 1200.
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Capper-Volstead Act is directed. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit
acknowledged this status.3 0 However, plaintiffs are also immune
from antitrust liability by reason of the Webb-Pomerene exemption. The primary policy consideration for the Webb-Pomerene
Act is promotion of export trade.3 1 The difficulty with the Ninth
Circuit's decision is that the court ignored these basic policy
considerations. Indeed, the result reached in Pacific Coast contravenes those policy objectives.
It is this dichotomy that Sunkist argued in its Petition for
Certiorari.32 It argued that its arrangement with Reliance was
enabling United States fruit to compete more effectively in the
Hong Kong market 3 thereby promoting export trade consistently
vAth the objectives of the Webb-Pomerene Act. Thus, it argued,
the policy objectives of Webb-Pomerene, rather than a blind application of who was or was not a qualified Webb-Pomerene association, ought to govern the decision. These policy objectives
were intended to benefit and apply to all who are engaged in
export trade. However, the Ninth Circuit chose to apply strictly
the language of Webb-Pomerene to protect only those who technically qualified under its provisions rather than other domestic
exporters who were incidentally competing with these protected
monopolists.
Similarly, the Capper-Volstead cooperative has been dealt
a severe blow by the Court's refusal to examine basic policy. Recalling that the basic policy objective underlying the CapperVolstead Act was the elimination of the non-producer "middle31. See 62 CONG. REC. 2050 (1922). The Webb-Pomerene Act, 15 U.S.C. § 61
(1970), is entitled in part "Promotion of Export Trade." See, e.g., United States v.
Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass'n, Inc., 393 U.S. 199 (1967) (dicta).
32. Supra note 4.
33. Sunkist changed its method of distribution to respond to heavy competitive
pressure in the Hong Kong market from other orange producing countries,
particularly Australia and Africa. These foreign competitors generally underpriced Sunkist and other American orange suppliers and offered attractive agency
arrangements which significantly reduced the market risks to the Hong Kong
fresh fruit importers. As a result, foreign orange sales increased dramatically.
The American exporters did not deal effectively with this competition. ...
As a result of the actions taken by Sunkist, a healthy competition between
Sunkist and the exporters developed, and overall American oranges competed
more effectively with foreign oranges sold in Hong Kong. From a total of
1,234,661 cartons of American oranges exported to Hong Kong in 1965, the last
year the exporters handled all the business, the trade grew to 3,089,386 cartons
in 1970 and 2,689,980 in 1971. Id. at 8-9, 11.
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man," an extension of that policy to international trade would
vindicate the interests of the cooperative producer. In this sense,
Pacific Coast represents a victory for non-producing middlemen
engaged in international trade.
An examination of the policy objectives of each statute
reveals that the Ninth Circuit's decision vindicated neither. In
addition, the refusal of the Supreme Court to grant certiorarihas
not helped to clear the resulting confusion. Sunkist, originally
organized under a statute for the purpose of eliminating middlemen, is now compelled to sell to middlemen in the international
market, with the probable result that overseas fruit prices will
increase coupled with a consequent decline in the United States'
competitive position. Pacific Coast, whose antitrust exemption
is designed to promote and stimulate United States exports, is
now in the position of causing a decline in the competitive position
of United States fruit products by reason of the higher prices it
charges over that of the producer Sunkist. Thus, the basic policy
objectives of the two statutes involved are the ultimate losers in
this case.
There is nothing especially novel about the observation that
vigorous support for the promotion of export trade and the enforcement of antitrust laws presents a near irreconcilable policy
conflict. The fact that existing antitrust laws interfere with
this country's ability to compete more efficiently and effectively
54
in many areas of international trade has not gone unnoticed.
Indeed, the passage of the Webb-Pomerene Act exempting export
associations from the antitrust laws is itself a recognition of this
dialectic.
Generally, however, when this conflict comes into focus as
in this case, it is the policy favoring increased competition, not
export trade, which dictate the result. As recent evidence of this,
a bill was introduced in 1973 to broaden the definition of export
34. E. KINTNER AND M. JOELSON, AN INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST PRIMER (1974).
Speaking of those favoring expansion of the Webb-Pomerene exemption:
The American businessman is placed in an unequal competitive position by U.S.
antitrust laws because other developed nations impose little or no antitrust
sanctions on their nationals; encourage and many times initiate the formation
of national and international cartels for the purpose of doing business abroad;
and give special encouragement to their export cartel associations, including
special rediscount rates, guarantees of currency convertibility, and protection
against credit and political risks.
Id. at 183.
35. S. 1483, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
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trade and eliminate the criminal and civil liability imposed upon
exporters by the Sherman and Clayton Acts respectively." Regrettably, in partial response to Justice Department opposition,
the antitrust exemption provision of the bill was deleted. 6
Although one may concede that the policy conflicts were
not clearly argued on petition to the U.S. Supreme Court, the
denial of the petitions for certiorariby the Court has helped delay
the day that these unfair competitive restraints on U.S. business
abroad shaped and articulated in the interest of increased competition at home, can be eliminated to permit U.S. businesses to
operate effectively and competitively in the international market
place. In the final analysis, what this case really represents is
the need for a congressional redefinition of the policies underlying
this country's export trade and the application of antitrust laws
thereto - a need which could have received indispensable recognition in a Supreme Court opinion.
Edward C. Bacon
36. 7 L. &

POLICY IN INT'L

Bus. 57, 79 (1975)

(citations omitted).

